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 ǯǡ
legal characterization of labour unfreedom reveals about the underlying conception 
of the labour market that informs contemporary approaches to labour law in the UK. 
It discusses how unfree labour is conceptualized within two key literatures Ȃ 
Marxist-inspired political economy and liberal approaches to modern slavery Ȃ and 
their underlying assumptions of the labour market and how it operates. As an 
alternative to these depictions of the labour market, it proposes a legal 
institutionalist or constitutive account. It develops an approach to legal 
characterization and jurisdiction that is attentive to modes of governing and the role 
of political and legal differentiation both in producing labour exploitation and 
unfree labour, and in developing strategies for its elimination. It argues that the 
problem with the modern slavery approach to unfree labour is that it tends to 
displace labour law as the principal remedy to the problem of labour abuse and 
exploitation, while simultaneously reinforcing the idea that flexible labour markets 




              
       
Just as it was Britain that took an historic stand to ban slavery two centuries ago, so 
Britain will once again lead the way in defeating modern slavery and preserving the 
freedoms and values that have defined our country for generations. 




 Marking the first anniversary since the Modern Slavery Act 2015 came into 
force, ǯhistoric and contemporary 
position as a world leader in the fight against slavery. Noting that the legislation was 
the first of its kind in Europe, she characterized the AǮ
penalties to put slave masters behind bars where they belong, with life sentences for 
the worst offendersǯ (May 2016). Modern slavery is a portmanteau term that 
captures slavery, forced labour, servitude and human trafficking. Although not 
identical in a legal sense, each term identifies different forms of unfree labour. The 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 consolidated the different crimes targeting activities that 
result in these forms of labour unfreedom and established an Independent Anti-
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Slavery Commissioner with a UK-wide remit to Ǯencourage good practice in the ǡǡǯ 
(HM Government, 2014: 29). At the same time as the UK government is committed 
to weeding out modern slavery and to tackling labour exploitation, it proudly 
declares tǮǯ (Business, 
industry and Skills, 2015: 5). 
 This paper treats thǯ
to examine what the legal characterisation of labour unfreedom reveals about the 
underlying conception of the labour market that informs contemporary approaches 
to labour law in the UK. I argue that the modern slavery paradigm tends to reinforce 
the view that labour exploitation and unfreedom are the result of morally culpable 
individuals who should be publicly vilified, rather than systemic and institutional 
features of state policies and practices relating to immigration and labour regulation Ǯǯour of employers. To do so, I focus on 
conceptions of unfree labour in order to probe the underlying ideas of the labour 
market, and, specifically, whether the labour market is understood as a realm of free 
exchange or as a legally instituted process.  
 The paper begins by discussing how unfree labour is conceptualized within 
two key literatures Ȃ Marxist-inspired political economy and liberal approaches to 
modern slavery Ȃ and their underlying assumptions of the labour market and how it 
operates. As an alternative to these depictions of the labour market, I propose a 
legal institutional or constitutive account, which I then deploy to probe the 
conceptualization of unfree labour in contemporary capitalism as a continuum. The 
paper then shifts gear to consider a legal positivist account of slavery, forced labour 
and trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, which are the key legal 
categories of unfree labour. Postivists are concerned with assigning the appropriate 
legal categories to the different forms of unfree labour. In contrast to this approach, 
I develop an account of legal characterization and jurisdiction that is attentive to 
modes of governing and the role of political and legal differentiation both in 
producing labour exploitation and unfree labour, and in developing strategies for 
their elimination. Which legal jurisdictions Ȅ criminal, immigration, human rights 
and labour law Ȃ are selected as the appropriate response to unfree labour and 
labour exploitation sets the boundaries to the process of legal characterization. 
Moreover, the choice of jurisdiction is a social and political process that allocates 
social relations and social activities into different legal domains or regulatory 
contexts with material and ideological effects. In the penultimate section, this 
approach, which I call the social dynamics of legal characterization, is applied to the 
legal treatment of modern slavery in the UK. To conclude, I argue that expansive 
conceptions of modern slavery and forced labour that call upon the criminal law 
simultaneously obscure and normalize mundane forms of labour abuse that are rife 
wǯ-liberal labour market. 
 
 
Labour Unfreedom and the Labour Market  
 
 Different literatures deploy a range of epistemological frames in identifying 
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what makes labour unfree. Moreover, different conceptions of unfree labour rest on 
incommensurable ontological commitments and different epistemological models of 
the labour market.1 A conception of free and unfree labour as discrete yet deeply 
interrelated phenomena builds on Karl Marx's method and writings about the Ǯcapitalist ǯǮǯlabour (Brass 2011; Marx 
1990), as well as feminist political economy approaches to understanding diverse 
modalities of labour in the capitalist mode of production (Strauss and Fudge, 2013; 
Fudge and Strauss, 2014; LeBaron 2015). By contrast, the liberal approach 
understands Ǯ-ǯ to be an enduring relationship of human 
domination which originated in pre-capitalist circumstances and has simply 
persisted unchanged into the present (Bales, 2004). However, although Marxist-
inspired and liberal accounts of labour unfreedom have very different normative Ǯǯǡn inadequate understanding of 
the role of law in a capitalist labour market. 
 The free/unfree labour distinction originates in the Marxist political 
economy literature, which has sought since the eighteenth century to understand 
(and define) linkages between political and social power and economic systems of Ǥǡǯ
freedom of the subject with the ability to engage in the exchange of property (which 
included, for Hegel, her own productive capacity), argued that under conditions of 
industrial capitalism labour power assumed the commodity form (Brass, 2011). 
Marx (1990, 49) characterised the buying and selling of labour power in capitalist Ǯǡ say of labour 
power, are constrained only by their free will. They contract as free agents, and the 
agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their ǯǤformal legal freedom to circulate in the labour market and to sell 
their labour power to a number of different employers was the hallmark of thǮǯ
labour of wage earners, albeit Marx emphasised the substantive economic 
conditions that compelled the sale of labour power. ǡǮ
property of a particular master; the worker must indeed sell himself to capital, but 
not to any particular capitalist, and so within certain limitations he may choose to 
sell himself to whomever he wishes; and he may also change his masterǯ (Marx, 
1990: 50)  
 This equality of exchange was subsequently reified in orthodox political 
economy and economic theory, which understands buyers and sellers of labour 
power as utility-maximizing agents operating in a frictionless world, and in contract 
law. Orthodox ecoǯ substantive economic 
conditions of industrial capitalism and the legal institutions of contract and property 
                                                        
1 For traditional Marxist political economists the distinction between unfree and 
free labour is difficult, if not impossible, to draw because under capitalist relations 
of production all labour is exploited. Liberals, by contrast, believe that free labour is 
qualitatively distinct from unfree labour since economic exploitation on its own 
does not result in unfree labour.  The institutional account that I advance argues 
that it is critical to understand the different modalities and forms of unfree labour 
by placing them within an historically and spatially specific labour regime.  
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that support capitalist relations of production, although they, like Marx, emphasise Ǯǯbour from personal and political forms of compulsion under 
capitalist social relations. Within liberal political economy the distinction between 
unfree and free labour was ontological as unfree labour is distinguished from free 
labour by virtue of the fact that the worker is coerced by force to threat and not 
simply economic need to enter or to remain in the labour process. Classical 
economists consider economic compulsion for workers to sell their labour power 
and liberals as a completely different order from legal, political or physical 
compulsion, all of which constitute different, but unacceptable, idioms of coercive 
power. 
 Kevin Balesǯ book Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy 
(2004) exemplifies the liberal abolitionist approach to modern slavery, which is 
how unfree labour is characterized. More recently, Bales (2012a: 282) offers an 
expansive definition of slavery, which is unmoored from social institutions. He ǮǡȂ not a legal definition, an 
analytical framewǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?: 360). He defines slavery as the 
experience or state of being of an individual slave with the human relationship of 
control: 
 Slavery is the control of one person (the slave) by another (the slaveholder 
 or slaveholders).  The control transfers agency, freedom of movement, access 
 to the body, and labor and its product and benefits to the slaveholder. The 
 control is supported and exercised through violence and its threat. The aim 
 of this control is primarily economic exploitation, but it may include sexual 
 use or physiological benefit (Bales, 2012b: 370).  Ǯǯand loss of personal 
liberty (Bales, 2012b: 370). 
 Although it has been criticised as unduly expansive (Patterson, 2012), this 
definition has wide currency in policy debates and popular discourse. Defining ǮǯǮpossesses or controls another person in such 
a way as to significantly deprive that person of their individual liberty, with the ǡǡǯǡ
civil society organization Walkfree (2017) estimated that in 2016, 48.5 million 
people were enslaved.2 
 This approach to unfree labour and slavery is redolent of ǯ
characterisation of slavery as Ǯa weed that growǯ1775 speech on 
conciliation with America. It conveys the idea that slavery is not a social and legal 
institution that requires actual cultivation, but, instead, the immoral and criminal 
actions of individuals who act outside the boundaries of liberal society. The problem 
is not with the market or the economy, nor is it systemic. Unfree labour is an 
aberration in a free market, either an historical remnant of a pre-modern society or 
a crime.  
 The tacit assumption is that the labour market is an arena of free exchange in 
which legally equal parties contract to their own mutual advantage. As Deakin 
                                                        
2 The definition of modern slavery used in compiling the index and numbers it 
comes up with are highly contentious (Gallagher, 2017). 
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(2013: 146) explains, under this Hayekian view of the market, Ǯ
identifies the subject of the exchange, contract law enforces voluntary agreements, 
and tort law enǤǯ3 The law simply 
provides neutral rules of the game and the ǯǮ
playing fǯǤǡ
labour, interferes with individual autonomy, it must be outlawed as a crime.  
 By contrast, Marx was very clear to emphasise the formal freedom of wage 
labourers and their substantive inequality (see also Hale 1923: 473). Wage 
labourers were doubly Ǯfreeǯ Ȃ free both from personal dependence upon a master 
and from access to the means of subsistence. Unlike slaves or servants, wage 
labourers could sell their labour power to whomsoever they chose. But, at the same 
time as Marx emphasized the formal freedom embodied in the wage contract, he Ǯǲǳ
essential precondition for the emergence of the economic structure of capitalist ǯȋǯǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤMarx detailed enclosure laws that disposed 
peasants, the vagrancy laws that coerced the surplus population, the wage-fixing 
laws, master and servant statutes and criminal provisions targeting trade unions Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ǡ
Chapter 28).  
 Marx distinguished primitive accumulation from industrial capitalism, and 
although he regarded the former as necessary for the development of the latter, 
what distinguished the latter was that it no longer relied on public or state law to 
directly coerce labour. In his early work, Marx (1971: 20) regarded the economic ǮǯǮǯ. Thus, there is some basis for ǯcomplaint that Marx regarded the law as secondary or ideological (Steinberg, 
2017: 5; Deakin et al., 2017: 191). ǯǡȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?Ȍ Ǯy focusing on the economic 
basis of the labor contract as part of the mystifying order of appearances Marx 
largely loses the opportunity to analyze how legal practices and state institutions ǯǤ 
 Inspired by Marx, the legal theorist Pashukanis (1989) developed a 
commodity form theory of law, which some commentators interpret as providing a 
constitutive account of law (Fletcher, 2013; Fudge 1999). Drawing a parallel 
between the commodity form and the legal form, Pashukanis (1989: 112) claimed 
that the constitution of the subject as the bearer of rights over commodities 
produces the legal fiction that individuals are formally equal. Fletcher (2013: 142) 
explains that ǯlegal subject as the bearer of 
property rights is not simply a passive reflection of socio-economic conditions; 
instead, the legal form helps to bring the subject into being. ǯ
the commodity form of law explains how legal concepts and institutions are the 
                                                        
3 As Knegt (this issue) notes, although the Hayekian view of the market as a 
spontaneous order has been criticised by economists for its failure to appreciate the 
significance of institutions, institutional economists also tend to naturalise markets 
as pre-existing, and ontologically distinct from, regulation.  
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expression of social relations, in capitalism the generalisation of exchange relations,  
while, at the same time, constitutive of social relations as the legal concepts and 
institutions of contract and property are essential for capitalism to be systematically 
reproduced. However, by focusing exclusively on the legal form at the expense of 
substantive legal norms, and by concentrating primarily upon the private law of 
contract and property, Pashukanis failed to appreciate the complex way that 
different legal subjects are constituted, for example, as wives, workers or menial 
servants, and that different rights and obligations are assigned to the different legal 
subjects (Fudge, 1999). While the wageworker is not compelled to enter an 
employment contract by anything other than economic necessity, the content of the 
contract is not simply a matter of bargaining power and the prior distribution of 
property rights. Instead, the rights and duties allocated to the parties to an 
employment contract are also a matter of substantive legal duties, such as obedience 
and good faith, that were implied by magistrates and judges to bind only one party, 
the employee, to the contract.4 Both liberals and Ǯǯts ignore the 
extent to which law is constitutive Ǯǯ wage labour because they fail to 
appreciate the extent to which ǡǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤ 
 
The Legal Constitution of the Labour Market 
 
 At its inception, labour was freed both from personal dependence and land 
through state-sanctioned force (Marx 1990: Vol 1, Chapters 27, 28). As Sven Beckert 
(2014: xvi) recounts, war capitalism, Ǯ
with enormous administrative, military, judicial and infrastructure ǯǡ Ǯ
the foundation from which evolved the more familiar industrial capitalismǯǤ 
Colonialism and enslavement were key features of war capitalism. Only as the 
institutions of wage labour and property rights gained strength was industrial 
capitalism, which depended upon a supply of workers to populate the burgeoning 
factories, able to flourish. Bonds of mutual obligation between lords and peasants 
had to be broken down, and labour coercion shifted from lords and masters to the 
state, its bureaucrats and judges (Beckert, 2014:183). The abolition of the slave 
trade in the British Empire in the early nineteenth century and the Ǯ
instantiation of the freedom of contract were accompanied by the enactment of pass ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤPaupers, vagrants and 
children were legally compelled by the state to work at that same time as the 
enclosure of the commons made alternative sources of livelihood impossible. Legal 
forms of coercion, such as strictly enforced labour contracts, tied workers to their 
                                                        
4 	ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?ȌǣǮ
performed their tasks within a controlling structure of power and status, ultimately ǥǤǤȂ the 
tendency for class and family origin to determine social destination Ȃ it is clear that 
the system of free enterprise capitalism embodied large quantities of unfree labour, ǲǳǤǯ 
(forthcoming). 
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Ǥ ? ?ǡ ? ? ?Ǯǯ ? ? ? ?1875, and many were sent to prison (Beckert, 2014: 
182).  
 The creation of a labour market and free wage labour in the metropole 
depended upon state power Ȃ the creation of private proǮǯǯbour power. Property is more than possession; it is a relationship 
between persons involving rights and duties with regard to things, and these rights 
and duties are state sanctioned, legitimated and enforced powers, capabilities, 
obligations and liabilities (Deakin et al., 2016: 4). Private law rules of property, ǮǯȋHale, 1923; Rittich, 2014: 328).  
 Historical institutǮas a set of social practices that plays an ǯȋSteinberg: 2016, 
60). Legal practices and state institutions structure power in the labour market and 
sphere of production and in this way they constitute productive relations. 
Employment relations are embedded in legal practices and state institutions. Legal 
concepts Ǯǲǳ, equipping them with 
legitimate powers, and ǥǯ (Knegt this 
issue). The duty to obey, which is implied by law into the contract of employment, is Ǯǯ (Hay, forthcoming). 
In this way the labour contract establishes the authority relation, the subordination 
of the employee, before the bargaining has begun. Once law positively ascribes ǡǮǯǤFrom the 
perspective of the longue durée, the economic coercion that gives rise to free wage 
labour is an Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤHowever, economic coercion is 
distinct from physical, legal and political compulsion, forms of coercion, all of which 
are treated by Marxists and liberals as indicators of unfree labour.  
 
 
Unfree Labour and Capitalism: From a Binary to a Continuum  
 
  Unfree labour has come to be understood by liberals and some Marxists as 
the anti-ǮǯǤFor Marxists, Ǯǯrefers to relations of 
production where direct political/legal compulsion is used to acquire and exploit 
labour power (Satzewich, 1991: 42). It was associated with pre-capitalist forms of 
economic organization such as feudalism or chattel slavery, and understood as 
peripheral to the capitalist world economy. A key concern has been how to 
understand the coexistence of unfree labour with the expansion of capitalism. 
Robert Miles (1987) emphasized the articulation of pre-capitalist forms of unfree 
labour, such as bonded labour, for example, to provide a supply of labour for 
emerging capitalist production regimes. He also stressed the coercive power of the 
state in reproducing unfree labour. Similarly, Robin Cohen (1987: 17) explained that, 
although specific forms of labour control such as chattel slavery, serfdom, debt 
bondage, apprentice labour, child labour, indentured and contract labour are 
associated with certain labour regimes, it is perfectly possible for a variety of 
different forms of labour control to co-exist at a specific time and place.  
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 Miles and Cohen also led the way in using unfree labour to explicate the 
relationship between capitalism and migration. Unfree labourers, such as peasants 
or bonded labourers, were compelled to migrate as a result of changes to 
agricultural production, especially capitalization and commodification, which 
resulted in their dispossession from the land. They became unfree migrant 
labourers as a result of immigration controls imposed by receiving countries that 
confined them to employment in certain sectors or bound them to particular 
employers. The state structures different modes of migrant labour incorporation 
through immigration controls that restrict the ability of migrant workers to freely 
circulate in the labour market (Satzewich, 1991). This approach draws upon an 
understanding of freedom that is rooted in the idea of the formal legal freedom to 
circulate in the labour market.  
 ǯ
(2006) sociological discussion of the ways in which particular national economies 
are constituted in and through the simultaneous inclusion of foreign workers in ǡǤǯ
insights is that the processes by which the citizen (us) and the foreigner (them) are 
constructed do not, as orthodox and Marxist political economists claim, function Ǯǯ
labourers. These categories are also constituted in the legal-juridical space of public 
law, instead of solely in the legal-juridical space of private law relations of contract 
and property, and they harness ideologies of race and gender (Sharma, 2006: 55-4).  
 Through her engagement ǡǯ
scholarship and policy work that has sought to highlight the centrality of unfree 
labour to contemporary capitalism and to conceptualize freedom/unfreedom as a 
continuum rather than a binary. In contemporary capiǮ
between free and unfree labour have been blurred, throwing into deep crisis the 
Marxian no less than the liberal emphasis on the freely concluded labour contract as 
juridically constitutive of the relations between labour and capitalǯȋ
Neilson, 2013:100). According to the ILO (2009: 8-9),  
 There is a continuum including both what can clearly be identified as forced 
 labour and other forms of labor exploitation and abuse. It may be useful to 
 consider a range of possible situations with, at one end, slavery and slavery-
 like practices and, at the other end, situations of freely chosen employment. 
 In between the two extremes, there are a variety of employment 
 relationships in which the element of free choice by the worker begins at 
 least to be mitigated or constrained, and can eventually be cast into doubt.  
The concept of a continuum of labour unfreedom or exploitation helps to illuminate 
how the denial of rights results in workers being situated at the unfree end of the 
spectrum (Skrivankova 2010; Strauss and Fudge 2013; 4; Waite et al., 2015; Scott 
2017). 
 Conceptualising labour unfreedom as a continuum is certainly an advance 
over seeing it as a simple binary. However, as Cathryn Costello (2015, 200) points 
out, from a legal perspective the metaphor of the continuum flattens out our 
understanding of unfree labour since  
 the continuum only runs along a single axis, from freedom to slavery.   
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 ǥt 
 to which different forms of work relations are legal institutions, not only 
 distinguished by their degree of freedom or voluntariness, but also 
 institutionalized and underpinned by different regulatory forms, a distinctive 
 law of slavery, serfdom and so on, as well as supporting structures in property, 
 contract, criminal and other laws.  ǯthe fact that labour markets are 
legally instituted processes. There are structural and systemic processes that 
operate at multiple scales and produce different regimes of unfree labour Ȃ slavery, 
serfdom, and indenture, for example Ȃ at specific times and places.  
   
The Limits to Legal Categorisation 
 
   Ǯǯǡȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ  ? ? ?ȌǡǮ
conceptǡǯǤFor her, its utility lies in its capacity to 
demonstrate the complex political economy of labour relations, which can be used 
to inform understandings of the legal categories of forced labour, servitude and 
slavery. While I agree that unfree labour is not a legal term, unlike Costello (2015: 
199) I do not think it is possible or desirable to understand and to test the legal 
definitions of forced labour, servitude, and slavery on their own terms. This is 
because the three key forms of unfree labour Ȃ slavery, forced labour and human 
trafficking Ȃ are defined in different legal instruments that build upon and overlap 
with each other, and it is social forces, and not a neutral process of legal 
interpretation, that gives these terms meaning.  
 The legal definition of slavery emerged at the height of colonialism (Allain, 
2012: 199). Defined in the League of Nations Slavery Convention 1926, slavery is 
Ǯthe status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to ǯǤ UN instruments outlawing slavery have also ǡǡǮǯǮdefinition contained in 
the Slavery Convention 1926 (Supplementary Convention on Slavery 1953). 
Enslavement is considered to be a crime against humanity under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. International, supranational and national courts 
provide meaning to the definition of slavery on a case-by-case basis (Allain, 2012: 
214-18; Costello, 2015: 201-2; Siller, 2016: 411).  
 TǯForced Labour Convention, 1930, which was adopted shortly after 
the Slavery Convention, is considered to be the authoritative legal definition of 
forced labour. It defines forced labour Ǯ
any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not ǯǤ5 While there have been attempts to expand the 
definition of slavery to include forced labour (Bales, 2012a), some commentators 
consider that it is preferable to distinguish even de facto slavery from forced labour 
                                                        
5 The definition is in Article 2 (1); however, Article 2(2) provides for certain 
exceptions to the rule, such as the work of convicted prisoners or military service 
(ILO 1930). 
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on the ground that slavery requires control ǡǮǯ (Cullen, 2012: 321; Costello 2015: 202).   
 Over the past 80 years, ILO supervisory bodies have elaborated the definition 
in response to the different ways in which workers are coerced to work, and in 
doing so they have provided guidance on the two key elements of the definition: 
menace of penalty and freedom of choice (ILO, 2007). For example, consent is 
rendered irrelevant where there is evidence of deception (ILO, 2012). Although 
initially framed in criminal law terms, in 1998 the ILO characterized the freedom 
from forced labour as a fundamental human right (ILO, 1998). More recently, the 
ILO has linked forced labour to multiple simultaneous violations of labour law (ILO, 
2014a). The 2014 Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 emphasised 
traditional labour law techniques for combatting forced labour (ILO Protocol 2014), 
while at the same time articulating an explicit link between forced labour and 
trafficking in persons (ILO Protocol 2014, Art 1(3)).  
 In the late 1990s, as destination countries in Europe, North America and 
Australia identified migrant smuggling as a security threat, human trafficking was 
transformed from a ǯ the 
context of migration, public order and organized crime (Gallagher, 2009: 790). The 
key international instrument adopted was the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (known as the 
Trafficking Protocol), which supplements the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. Its goal is to provide a universal model that states can implement 
in their domestic legislation. Although the definition of trafficking in the Protocol 
was not tied to the movement of people across national borders, from its inception 
the Trafficking Protocol was framed in terms of both criminal and immigration law.  
 The Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in terms of three elements:  (1) 
the act, which includes the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring of 
persons; (2) the means, which includes the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, fraud, abuse of power; and (3) the purpose, which is exploitation. Instead 
of defining exploitation, the Trafficking Protocol ǮǡǯǮǡǯ (UN 2000, Article3 (a)). Legal scholars disagree over whether Ǯǯ only to specific categories of labour 
unfreedom such as slavery or forced labour that are already defined in legal 
instruments (Allain, 2013: 350, 369) or as encompassing a broader polythetic 
definition (Stoyanova, 2017: 67-8). 
  The problem of overlapping legal instruments and legal frames for 
attributing precise legal meaning to different forms of unfree labour is exemplified 
by the European Court of Human Rightsǯ interpretation of Article 4 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits, without defining, slavery, 
servitude, forced and compulsory labour. The ǯ2005 decision in Siliadin v 
France broke new ground when it ruled that Article 4 gave rise to positive 
obligations on states. It relied on international legal instruments, specifically the ǯ convention on forced labour, to interpret the meaning of compulsory and 
forced labour in the Convention to include domestic servitude, and it implicated 
immigration controls in the construction of unfreedom. In Rantsev v. Cyprus (2010), 
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the European Court of Human Rights also held that Article 4 encompassed human 
trafficking, without identifying whether trafficking amounted to slavery, forced 
labour or servitude and implicated restrictive immigration controls as contributing 
to the violation. While the failure to delineate the relationship between the different 
legal harms creates uncertainty, more troublesome is how some governments have 
responded to the link between immigration controls and forced labour. The UK ǯresponse to the claim that very restrictive immigration controls on 
domestic workers from outside of the European Union contributed to violations of 
Article 4 was to make immigration controls more restrictive (Fudge and Strauss, 
2014: 171-4; Stoyanova, 2017: 393). Despite the advocacy of some legal scholars 
that by adopting an integrated approach the European Court of Human Rights can 
develop a labour rights approach to the interpretation of Article 4 that downplays, 
rather than strengthens immigration controls (Mantouvalou, 2016: 238), the Court 
has yet to take up this suggestion (Costello, 2015: 225-6).    
 The legal definitions of the different forms of unfree labour are open-
textured and imprecise. Ǯǯ of these 
different legal categories Ȃ slavery, forced labour, servitude and trafficking for the 
purpose of labour exploitation Ȃ from a legal dogmatic or positivist point of view 
(Allain, 2013; Costello, 2015; Stoyanova, 2017). The meaning of each term depends 
upon how international, supranational and domestic courts, and United Nations and 
ILO supervisory bodies elaborate them. Moreover, there is no clear correspondence 
between how terms like slavery and exploitation are used by civil society and 
advocacy groups, on the one hand, and in legal instruments and by state and legal 
institutions, on the other. This instability in the legal definitions is itself productive Ǯǯǡǡǡ
enhance state power. Ǯǯ can be used to Ǯǯȋ-Fuchs, 2016: 785) 
ignores the social dynamics of legal characterisation. Such strategies run the risk of 
enhancing state coercive power, which may then be turned against the very 
populations that legal advocates seek to protect.6 Instead of searching for the Ǯǯ legal definition or attempting to stretch legal definitions to include an ever-
broader range of activity, it may be more fruitful to explore the interaction between 
social and legal characterisation in order to better understand the social 
foundations of legal technicalities and their associated legal domains. 
 
Legal Construction, Jurisdiction and Unfree labour 
 
 Legal characterisation is often seen as the process by which different 
regulatory paradigms are assigned to resolve a social problem.7 Regulatory 
paradigms or contexts involve assumptions about the nature and causes of the 
problem, the goals of regulation, and the strategies or techniques of regulation, 
which include burden of proof, remedy and redress, form and process of 
adjudication (Shamir, 2012).  
                                                        
6 See the case studies in Fudge and Strauss 2014; Fudge 2016 a.  
7 This discussion draws on Fudge, 2016a, 155-158.  
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 Typically, there is a range of possible legal categories inhabiting different 
regulatory contexts or paradigms. The process of legal characterization, which is 
process of assigning a legal category or legal classification to a social relation or 
activity, operates at two levels, the meso level of the institutional and discursive 
construction of regulatory contexts, and the micro level of deciding whether a 
particular instance falls with a specific regulatory context. At the meso level, legal 
characterization involves legal construction, which is the active assignment of legal 
consequences to legal character (Freedland and Kountouris, 2011). For example, 
classifying a particular contract as an employment, and not a commercial, contract 
places the contract into the regulatory context (or jurisdiction) of employment or 
labour law. Not only are specific duties implied by law in the employment contract, 
which are not implied into commercial contracts, a range of statutes, such as the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, govern the employment contract in the UK (Freedland 
et al, 2016). Legal construction is the process that forges the link between legal 
character, for example an employment relationship, and incidents, such as implied 
duties and statutes, creating a microsystem with a particular political and forensic 
dynamic that derives from the regulatory context. Each regulatory context also has 
its own complex internal structure and dynamic made up of different layers and 
scales of legal principle, doctrine and institutions. Different layers or scales of 
regulation Ȃ from international law and constitutional norms, through specific 
statutes, to the contract of employment in the case of personal work relations Ȃ are 
integrated into each other. These regulatory layers not only interact with each other 
as normative legal constructs, they also interact with the patterns and constructions 
with which those involved in the making of personal work relations, both workers, 
and, perhaps even more significantly, employers, place or seek to place their own 
dealings or arrangements. The process of legal construction has real ideological and 
material effects on how social actors organize their relations and activities. 
 As we saw in the preceding section, there are at least four different 
regulatory contexts or domains (crime, labour, human rights and immigration law) 
that govern unfree labour. Each operates at the international, national, and 
subnational levels and involves a wide range of institutions, discourses and 
practices that govern unfree labour (Fudge and Strauss, 2014; Fudge, 2016a). The 
idea of regulatory context or domain can be elaborated in terms of the concept of ǯǡthe governance of legal governance (Valverde, 
2009:  ? ? ?ȌǤǮǯȋȌǮǯȋȌǡǮǲǳȂ and most importantly because of its relative invisibility, 
tǲǳǯȋǣ145). The objects of governance Ȃ what is be 
regulated Ȃ for example, whether the exploitation of workers is a matter of criminal 
or labour law or the treatment of migrant workers fall within immigration or 
criminal law, are associated with governance technologies (how the object should 
be governed), which, in turn, can be understood in terms of institutional capacities 
and rationalities as well as social and political norms and practices.   
 Jurisdiction understood as governance sets the outer boundaries of the 
process of legal characterization, and it is an outcome of social and political 
contestation. It functions to allocate social relations and social activities into 
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different legal domains or regulatory contexts, and in doing so channels them into Ǯǯȋ, 2011, 254). During periods 
of equilibrium, legal jurisdiction creates cognitive maps about how best to navigate 
our social world (Fudge, 2014). However, periods of equilibrium are punctuated by 
episodes of social and legal contestation when the question of appropriate 
jurisdiction and governance techniques are up for grabs.  
  Jurisdiction also has an external dimension. Different regulatory domains or 
jurisdictions are dynamic, plural, overlapping and permeable, involving a number of 
institutions, actors and discourses that operate across a range of scales, with 
different degrees of attachment or embeddedness. Even within the same scale, for 
example international law, there are conflicts between rules or rule-systems and 
institutional practices that deviate from one another (Thomas, 2011). Moreover, the 
same jurisdiction, for example the law of trafficking, can operate simultaneously at 
the national, supranational and international levels. Different jurisdictions and 
different legal scales reflect contested and complicated histories involving the 
interaction of political economy and historical contingency (Thomas, 2011: 408). 
 The important issue is how the different jurisdictions fit together to govern 
the social processes that produce the different dimensions of unfreedom. It is 
helpful to think of the legal governance of unfree labour as composed of regulatory 
domains or spheres of jurisdictions (for example, criminal, immigration, human 
rights and labour law) that can attract or repel each other. The internal structure of 
each sphere or domain is complex, composed of a specific regulatory paradigm, with 
its own social assumptions, goals and technologies, which operates simultaneously 
along and across different scales and institutions that have varying degrees of 
influence on one another. Nor are the normative assumptions and goals of each 
sphere unitary (Numhauser-Henning, 2013). Externally, the borders between the 
spheres or domains may overlap or bleed into each other; two or more jurisdictions 
can share discourses, doctrines and institutions. The attraction and repulsion of 
different legal domains or jurisdictions operates both on the level of positive law 
and doctrine and on that of normative analysis. Moreover, jurisdictions interact in a 
social and political environment, which can function as a conductor that amplifies 
the force of a particular jurisdiction or an insulator that weakens the influence of 
one jurisdiction when compared with another.  
 Where and on what basis jurisdictional boundaries are drawn determines, 
for instance, how a subject stands in relation to existing legal categories, and thus 
how the subject can legitimately be treated (Dorsett and McVeigh, 2012). How these 
lines are drawn in practice, however, resembles an Ǯǯ
(Valverde, 2015: 86) as the assignment of jurisdiction is transformed from a 
political conflict over the goals and technologies of governance into a neutral 
process of sorting subjects into legal categories. Conflicts over the assignment of 
legal categories arise when different jurisdictions overlap, such as immigration 
controls and forced labour. Legal positivists tend to treat the assignment of 
jurisdiction to different forms of unfree labour as either a problem of legal definition Ǯǯ jurisdiction (Mantouvalou, 2016). The problem with 
these approaches to the process of legal characterization is that they tend to 
normalise and legitimatise the deeper assumptions upon which the jurisdictions 
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governing unfree labour are constructed, and fail to appreciate the extent to which 




Modern Slavery and the Social Dynamics of Legal Characterisation  
 
 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 consolidates the existing criminal offences (of 
slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour, and trafficking for labour 
exploitation) in domestic legislation. ǯ
strategy of celebrating its role in combatting slavery, which began when the then- 
(Labour) Home Secretary John Reid signed onto the Councǯ ? ? ? ?
Convention on Action in Trafficking Against Human Beings on a desk used by 
William Wilberforce (Balch, 2015, 92- ?ȌǤǮwith ǥ
Wilberforceǯǥ abolitionist crusadeǯ, the Modern Slavery Bill coincided with the 
introduction of the Immigration Bill (now Immigration Act 2014), which was Ǯǯ
limiting migrant access to public services and increasing to £20,000 the penalty for 
employers found to have hired a migrant worker without the appropriate work 
authorization (Robinson, 2015: 132). Having made tackling modern slavery a 
personal priority, the then Coalition Home Secretary (and now Conservative Prime 
Minister) Theresa May understood that the Slavery Bill was a much needed 
counterweight to ǯand Conservative ǯ
migrants (Balch, 2015; Robinson, 2015).  
 Enacted just weeks before the May 2015 general election, the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 does not ǡǮ
holding a person in slavery or servitude or requiring a person to perform forced or 
compulsory labour are to be construed in accordance with Article 4 of the Human 
Rights Conventionǯ (Moderns Slavery Act 2015, s 1(4)). It also includes the crime of 
traffickingǡǯǮǯǡ
deceive, and force individuals against their will into a life of abuse, servitude and 
inhumane treatmentǯȋHM Government, 2014: 9). An Anti-Slavery Commissioner has 
been appointed, and the strategy for combatting modern slavery builds upon the ǯed crime and counter-terrorism. What has come 
to be known as the supply chain transparency provision requires certain businesses 
(those with over £ 36 million turnover per year) to produce an annual slavery and 
human trafficking statement for each financial year stating whether or not and, if so, 
what steps that they have taken to eliminate slavery and trafficking from their 
supply chains and their own business. Despite significant criticism that the Modern 
Slavery Bill Ǯ-ǯǮsuresǯǡmade 
only faint gestures towards labour protection (Robinson 2015: 140).  
 ǯ-border slavery and 
trafficking and not with forced labour or trafficking for the purpose of labour 
exploitation that occurs within the UK is reinforced by the Immigration Act 2016, 
which is designed to make it harder for people to live and work illegally in the UK 
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and to impose tougher penalties and sanctions on rogue employers who exploit 
illegal migrants. Among other things, the 2016 Act makes illegal working a criminal 
offence, with a maximum custodial sentence up to fifty weeks in England and Wales 
and an unlimited fine. Punishments for employers who employ migrant workers 
without proper authorization to work in the UK have been increased and businesses 
that employ such workers can be closed down.   
 This concern to punish and to prevent illegal work by migrants is entwined 
with the goal of preventing labour exploitation. Here it appears that the government 
seeks to protect two quite different groups from exploitation: vulnerable migrants 
and decent employers. According to then-Immigration Minister James Brokenshire, 
 Some employers seem to think that by employing workers who are less likely 
 to complain, including vulnerable migrants, they can undercut the local 
 labour market and mistreat them with impunity. The unscrupulous need to 
 know that breaking the law is a high-risk activity and the full force of the 
 state will be applied to them (Home Office, 2016a). 
But the problem is that the Immigration Act 2016 displays little Ǯ
well-ȋȌǯ 
international norms on the treatment of migrant workers (Davies, 2016: 439). The 
ILO and the Council of Europe agree that it is critical to erect a firewall between the 
enforcement of labour standards and immigration controls (Crépeau and Hastie, 
2015). Under the very broad doctrine of illegality that operates in the UK, except in 
limited circumstances, irregular migrant workers are barred from enforcing their 
statutory rights (Allen v Hounga, 2014). In fact, the only possibility that a migrant 
worker without lawful status has for redress is if they are designated a victim of 
slavery or trafficking under the Modern Slavery Act, where there is recourse to a 
reparation order. In other cases, the government can seize wages owed or paid to a 
migrant who engages in illegal work as proceeds of a crime.  
 Thus, it ǯǮǯ
employers. According to the consultation document, which the government treated 
as fulfillment of its promise to review the Gangmasters ǡǮother 
businesses struggle to compete against rogue employers, distorting competition and ǯȋBIS and Home Office, 2015: 
paragraph 53). In fact, the Government Ǯbelieves that labour market exploitation is 
an increasingly organised criminal activity and that government regulators that ǯǯ (UK Parliament, 2016: 
6).  
 The Immigration Act 2016 gestures towards enforcing employment 
standards through the establishment of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement 
(DLME) and by expanding the remit of the GLA, now called the Gangmasters and 
Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA) to the entire labour market. The Directorǯs role is to 
provide strategic direction for the organisations responsible for regulating the UK 
labour market. Labour Abuse Prevention Officers have been given police powers to 
carry out enquiries into labour market abuse offences, which include failure to pay 
the national minimum wage, breaches of the Employment Agency Act and the 
Gangmasters Licensing Act, as well as modern slavery. Previously, the 
ǯ
mission was licensing labour contractors in the agriculture, food and shellfish 
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sectors. It is an offence to operate in the specified sectors without a license and in 
order to obtain a license the labour contractor (gangmaster) has to demonstrate 
compliance with a range of labour standards and protections, including the payment 
of tax and national insurance, health and safety, and the provision of proper 
accommodation to workers. The grant of police powers combined with the new 
mandate to enforce the Modern Slavery Act raises the fear that the GLAA will be 
transformed from an agency that uses licensing to enforce labour standard to one 
that uses criminal law to target a narrow range of egregious forms of labour abuse. 
The Conservative government has already begun to shift away from the licensing 
system, and the Immigration Act 2016 could provide another opportunity for the 
government to dial it back (Fudge, 2016b: 6). 
 Dǯ the DLME Ǯ covers labour 
market breaches, and not immigration ǯ (Home Office, 2016a), the GLAA is 
authorized to conduct joint operations with the UK Border Force, which enforces 
immigration controls. This intermingling of the enforcement of labour standards 
and immigration controls could undermine the ability of the Director and the GLAA 
to gather intelligence and to enforce labour standards. The extent to which the 
DLME is able to steer the GLAA and other enforcement agencies towards labour 
protection and away from prosecuting modern slavery and detecting illegal workers 
is an open question, especially as ǯstrategy is subject to 
approval by the secretaries of state for both the Home Office and the Department of 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). At the same time as the Home 
Office took great pride in its fight against modern slavery and embarked on its plan 
to make the UK a hostile environment for illegal migrants, the precursor to BEIS, the 
Department of Business, Industry and Skills, was Ǯǯ
employers. Ǯ
framework in place to ensure ǯǡ
nothing could be further from the truth (Fudge 2016b, 6: Scott, 2017: 189). With the 
exception of the GLAA, labour inspection in the UK is complaint driven; it is also 
profoundly fragmented and confined to a limited set of standards. Instead of 
providing for a national labour inspectorate with wide ranging powers to enforce 
the entire suite of labour rights, the UK relies on individuals to bring legal claims to 
enforce their rights (Fudge 2016b; 6; Scott 2017:189). In this context, it is 
questionable whether the DLME will be able to persuade the government that the 
ǯs licensing mandate should be extended to new sectors and that resources 
should be devoted to licensing rather than prosecuting slave drivers.  
 Combined the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Immigration Act 2016 ǯthat labour 
exploitation and unfreedom are the fault of morally culpable individuals who should 
be publicly vilified, rather than systemic and institutional features of state policies 
and practices relating to immigration and labour regulation Ǯǯ. The modern slavery paradigm, which embodies a 
criminal law approach, tends both to skew attention toward the worse cases of 
abuse and to transpose the stereotypes that dominate the public discourses around 
slavery and trafficking into the discussion of labour exploitation. Litigators and 
advocates will often select the most egregious cases of abuse and the most 
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sympathetic victims in order either to win the case or to create a precedent, which 





 The attribution of a legal category to a specific form of unfree labour reveals 
how unfree labour is conceptualized, which, in turn, depends upon prior ontological 
commitments about whether the labour market is a sphere of free exchange or one 
of domination. The approach that dominates in the UK regards unfree labour Ǯas a 
series of individualized instances of domination rather than as a systemic social 
relationship of insecurity and exploitation involving relations of power within 
contemporary capitalismǯ (LeBaron, 2015: 2). This liberal approach to modern Ǯǯ
instances of bad behavior and human rights law as the appropriate way to protect 
victims.  
 Governments, such as that led by Theresa May, Ǯǯ
agenda and portray migrant workers as a threat to their own citizens imbue the 
criminal law jurisdiction with a great deal more force that that of labour law when it 
comes to addressing the exploitation of workers. The problem with the modern 
slavery approach to unfree labour is that it tends to overbear other jurisdictions 
such as labour law that can be used to remedy the problem of labour abuse and 
exploitation. It is unlikely that labour and migrant rights advocates will be able to 
stretch the meaning of modern slavery to protect workers, including those without 
immigration authorization to work in the UK, from employers who breach labour 
standards. The Immigration Act 2016 demonstrates that a criminal approach to 
modern slavery is perfectly compatible with tighter immigration controls and a 
criminaǮǯȋ	Ȍ.  Moreover, the modern 
slavery paradigm reinforces the idea that flexible labour markets of the type that 
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